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1. Introduction 
The Simla Conference of 1913–14, held in Simla, India, was a momentous event in 
which representatives of Tibet, China, and Britain discussed the political status of Tibet 
after the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912. Although many scholars have examined 
the international circumstances around Tibet in the early twentieth century, the foreign 
policy of the Tibetan government has remained unclear, mainly because it is still very 
difficult to access Tibetan primary sources located in the Tibet Autonomous Region of 
the People’s Republic of China. However, in the private office of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama and the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (LTWA) in Dharamshala, 
India, is a Tibetan record of the Simla Conference, Shing stag rgya gar ’phags pa’i yul 
du dbyin bod rgya gsum chings mol mdzad lugs kun gsal me long (The Clear Mirror of 
the Negotiation of the Convention between Britain, China, and Tibet in India in the 
Wood Tiger Year; hereafter referred to as the Kun gsal me long). Although some 
scholars, such as Shakabpa (1976), have examined the process of negotiation at the 
Simla Conference by using the Kun gsal me long, the value of the text itself as a 
historical source has not been fully clarified. One of the most important reasons for this 
problem is the absence of a comparative analysis of the Kun gsal me long and the 
British diplomatic documents that previous studies have used as primary sources for the 
Simla Conference. 
The primary language of this tripartite conference was English, and furthermore, 
the proceedings of each tripartite meeting were written in English. Because Kun gsal 
me long was compiled after the conference by the Tibetan officials, we must investigate 
how the Kun gsal me long was created, what kind of records it includes, and how its 
contents differ from documents in the English archives. In this article, I will examine 
the features of the Kun gsal me long by comparing it with the official British records of 
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the Simla Conference. Based on this textual analysis, I would like to assert the value of 
the Kun gsal me long as a historical source and indicate new information that it contains, 
in order to create a clearer picture of Tibetan foreign policy.  
 
2. Unsolved Problems Concerning Historical Materials in Researching the 
Simla Conference 
The Simla Conference was held between Tibet, China, and Britain in Simla, India, from 
October 1913 to July 1914. The participants discussed the political status of Tibet and 
its physical borders after the collapse of the Qing Empire. However, after completing 
these complicated discussions, China refused to sign the convention, making the 
tripartite agreement a failure. Because of the important topics discussed at the Simla 
Conference, we must pay close attention to the historical materials in order to 
investigate effectively the process of the negotiations at this conference.  
Many previous studies of the Simla Conference have been based upon English 
materials (Lamb 1966; Mehra 1974; Singh 1988). In particular, the India Office 
Records (IOR), held in the British Library in London, and the Foreign Office Records 
(FO), held in the National Archives in London, contain valuable primary sources 
concerning the Simla Conference. These studies clarified the process of the tripartite 
negotiation. In addition to these archival sources was widely published in Beijing in 
1940, The Boundary Question between China and Tibet: A Valuable Record of the 
Tripartite Conference between China, Britain and Tibet, Held in India, 1913–1914, 
hereafter referred to as BQ, which also contains the main English proceedings of the 
Simla Conference.1 This book is easily accessible, and many scholars have used it, 
such as Alastair Lamb (1966). The English materials mentioned above can give us 
firsthand information about what subjects were discussed at the Simla Conference, 
particularly concerning the British policy. Besides those, Feng Mingzhu (1996) used 
the Chinese archives held in the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in 
Taipei. Feng used Chinese diplomatic documents in the archives to investigate the 
Chinese process of making foreign policy during the conference.  
In contrast to this, the foreign policy of the Tibetan Government has not been fully 
clarified, because of the difficulty in accessing Tibetan primary sources. Currently, the 
                                                     
1 The detailed process of the compilation and publication of BQ is not completely known. However, it 
seems that a part of BQ was most likely composed of documents possessed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of China, and these documents were published in Taipei (see Waijiaobu 2006: 1–
55). 
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archives of the Tibetan Autonomous Region are inaccessible; however, one remarkable 
text exists: the Kun gsal me long. This text’s current location is the private office of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama, and a copy is in the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives 
in Dharamshala, India.2 The authors were Bshad-sgra dpal-’byor rdo-rje (circa 1861–
1919; see Petech 1973: 181–183), the Tibetan plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference, 
and his assistant at the conference, Khri-smon Nor-bu dbang-rgyal (1874–1945?; see 
Petech 1973: 96–97). According to the colophon of the Kun gsal me long, after the end 
of the conference, the thirteenth Dalai Lama ordered them to compile the process of 
negotiation of the Simla Conference “for future reference” (see 159a). The Kun gsal me 
long is composed of 159 folios and is written in Dbu med script. The main contents are 
a collection of documents on the conference arranged chronologically. The authors 
organized all of the documents into three chapters as discussed below. The exact date of 
completion is unknown, but Bshad-sgra died in 1919 before it was completed. 
Afterward, Khri-smon took over from Bshad-sgra and completed the work in the 
1920s.3 I do not know how many texts were made, but according to some sources, the 
book was not published for the public, and only select officials and aristocrats in the 
government seemed to be granted access to it.4 
Several scholars have focused on the Kun gsal me long as a historical source. W. 
D. Shakabpa, a high-ranking official of the Tibetan Government before fleeing the 
Tibetan mainland in 1959, is perhaps the first scholar to use the Kun gsal me long to 
explain the process of negotiation at the Simla Conference in his famous book, Bod kyi 
srid don rgyal rabs (Tibet: A Political History). Shakabpa received many kinds of 
historical materials, including the documents of the Simla Conference, from his uncle 
Khri-smon (Shakabpa 1976: 3–4). In addition to this, Carole McGranahan (2003) 
briefly mentioned the Kun gsal me long in a footnote of her article, which analyzed the 
diplomatic negotiations between Tibet, China, and Britain during the early twentieth 
century.  
In contrast to these studies of the Simla Conference, Tashi Tsering (1985) used the 
Kun gsal me long to add a remarkable study about the local history in Kham, Eastern 
Tibet, during the late nineteenth century. The Kun gsal me long contains important 
                                                     
2 I want to express my deep thanks to Tashi Tsering, the Director of AmnyeMachen Institute in 
Dharamshala, for providing me with a copy of the Tibetan text held in the private office of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama and much valuable information about the Kun gsal me long.  
3 Khri-smon was stationed at the Kham from 1922 to 1926 as Mdo-smad spyi-khyap (Petech 1976: 97); 
therefore, it seems that he completed the compilation of the Kun gsal me long until before 1922. It will 
require further information.  
4 Shakabpa 1976: 3–4; Bka’ zur lcog steng thub bstan nor bzang 2007: 182–183, 192–193. 
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records concerning the control of the Lhasa government over Kham because of the 
claim of the plenipotentiary that Tibet held territorial rights over Kham at the 
Conference. Yudru Tsomu (2006) recently analyzed Kham history during nineteenth 
century in more detail, using various Tibetan and Chinese sources, including Kun gsal 
me long. Thus far, however, there is an absence of comparative analysis of the British 
diplomatic documents and the Kun gsal me long. Therefore, the differences between the 
Kun gsal me long and the English materials are not clear. Without this analysis it has 
been difficult determine the true value of the Kun gsal me long as a historical source for 
the Simla Conference. In the next chapter, I will examine the features of the Kun gsal 
me long by carefully comparing it with the documents in the IOR, FO, and BQ.  
 
3. The Comparative Analysis of the Kun gsal me long and the English Materials 
First, I will briefly explain the structure of the Kun gsal me long. There are four 
chapters, organized according to the process of negotiation as shown below:  
Chapter 1 (1a–97b): The documents concerning the tripartite negotiation.  
Chapter 2 (100a–110b): The documents concerning the bilateral negotiation 
between Tibet and Britain. 
Chapter 3 (112a–143b): The submitted petitions of the Tibetan plenipotentiary 
to the Conference through Charles Bell.  
Chapter 4 (144a–159b): The unsubmitted petitions of the Tibetan 
plenipotentiary. 
The table below shows the result of the comparative analysis of the Kun gsal me 
long and the English materials on the Simla Conference. In the table, I identify which 
parts of the Kun gsal me long are consistent with the English materials in the IOR, FO, 
and BQ. The parts of the Kun gsal me long that were not referenced as found in the 
English materials were left blank.  
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Table 1: Comparative Analysis of the Kun gsal me long and the English Materials 
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Although this table is a work in progress and requires further investigation, I have 
attempted to clarify the process of the compilation of the Kun gsal me long. The next 
figure roughly illustrates the differences in creating the Kun gsal me long and the 
English materials.  
Figure 1: The Process of the Compilation of the Kun gsal me long  
 
At each tripartite conference meeting, the Tibetan plenipotentiary wrote his 
statement in Tibetan. The statement was then translated into English before being 
formally submitted to the meeting (see fig. 1-A).5 The FO, IOR, and BQ contain 
primarily English translations of the Tibetan statements, the English proceedings, and 
the English statements of the Chinese and British plenipotentiaries (see figs. 1-C and 
1-D). The Kun gsal me long, on the other hand, contains the Tibetan translations of the 
English language statements of the British and Chinese plenipotentiaries (see fig. 1-E). 
It also seems to contain the original Tibetan language statements of the Tibetan 
plenipotentiary (see fig. 1-B). 
Based on the table and the figures, I categorized the documents in the Kun gsal me 
long into four groups: 
 
Group 1: Pre-translation Tibetan Documents  
At the Simla Conference, the Tibetan plenipotentiary translated his statements into 
English before they were formally submitted to the meetings. It is difficult to clarify in 
                                                     
5 In another case, Bshad-sgra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, read his statement in Tibetan, and it was 
translated sentence by sentence by the translator, as were the informal discussions of 11 December 1913. 
IOR/L/P&S/10/343, P128, Informal Discussions, 11 December 1913. 
190
detail how the Tibetan plenipotentiary translated his statements into English; however, I 
will undertake to explain the process based on several pieces of information. 
According to The Biography of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, written in Tibetan 
(hereafter referred to as DL13), one English translator and one Chinese translator 
accompanied the plenipotentiary to the Simla Conference (DL13: 128a). Unfortunately, 
there is no detailed personal information about either translator in DL13. On the side of 
British Government, Alfred Charles Bell (1870–1945) and Kazi Dawa Samdup (1868–
1922) were the translators. Charles Bell, then the Sikkim Political Officer, had already 
learned the Tibetan language well enough to compile a dictionary and a grammar 
textbook while residing in Darjeeling at the beginning of the 1900s. Furthermore, Bell 
had established a relationship of mutual trust with the thirteenth Dalai Lama and 
Bshod-sgra, because he was responsible for taking care of them when they took refuge 
in Darjeeling from 1910 to 1912 after fleeing from the Chinese army, which had been 
sent to Lhasa from Sichuan province in February 1910. Therefore, he was appointed the 
assistant to the Tibetan plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference at the strong request of 
the thirteenth Dalai Lama.6 It seems, however, that Charles Bell merely approved the 
final translation of the Tibetan statements before submitting them to the tripartite 
meeting, and that the actual translator was Kazi Dawa Samdup. Kazi Dawa Samdup, 
from Sikkim province, was Charles Bell’s translator and subordinate.7 As a young man, 
Kazi Dawa Samdup mastered both English and Tibetan, and he served as Charles 
Bell’s interpreter and translator while the thirteenth Dalai Lama stayed in Darjeeling in 
1910. Contained in the Charles Bell Collection are the final drafts of the translated 
statements of the Tibetan plenipotentiary with the signature, date, minor changes, and 
short comments such as “true translation” added by Kazi Dawa Samdup 
(IOR/MSS/EUR/F80/189: 26). Therefore, it seems that Kazi Dawa Samdup definitely 
did the practical translation in consultation with the Tibetan plenipotentiary.  
If we carefully compare the statements of the Tibetan plenipotentiary in the Kun 
gsal me long to Kazi Dawa Samdup’s translation into English, we occasionally find 
differences in the two. For instance, “Tibetan Statement of Limits on Tibet,” dated 
January 12, 1914, in the IOR/MSS/EUR/F80/189: 1–26 is consistent with folio 25b1–
                                                     
6 IOR/MSS/EUR/F80/5e6, from the thirteenth Dalai Lama to Harding, the Viceroy of India, on July 8, 
1913.   
7 After the Conference, Kazi Dawa Samdup compiled an English–Tibetan dictionary, translated the Tibetan 
Buddhist Texts into English, and in his last years served as Professor at Calcutta University (Kazi Dawa 
Samdup 2008). 
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37b4 in the Kun gsal me long. 8  However, the English version in the 
IOR/MSS/EUR/F80/189: 1–2 contains, above the explanation of the Tibetan claim, a 
list of place names in Eastern Tibet that the Chinese plenipotentiary claimed as 
territory under the direct control of China. The Tibetan version in the Kun gsal me 
long does not contain this list (25b1–26a). Kazi Dawa Samdup presumably inserted 
the list of place names into the English version as additional information for arguing 
against the Chinese position in consulting with the Tibetan plenipotentiary. Otherwise, 
the authors of the Kun gsal me long deleted this information from the Tibetan original 
statement when they compiled it. 
These kinds of differences between the Kun gsal me long and English versions do 
occur; therefore, when we examine the Kun gsal me long, we have to constantly 
consider the possibility that these original statements are not consistent with the 
statements submitted at the meetings. In addition, we have to pay attention to the 
possibility that the authors made changes to the pre-translation Tibetan statements when 
they compiled the Kun gsal me long. 
 
Group 2: The Tibetan Translation of the English Documents at the Conference 
In the Kun gsal me long, we can classify the Tibetan translation of the English 
documents into two categories. 
1. The translation of the English proceedings. From October 1913 to July 1914, 
eight tripartite meetings were held at the conference. It was decided at the first meeting 
that English would be the official language of the proceedings. 9  The British 
plenipotentiary, A. H. McMahon, and a secretary to the conference recorded, 
documented, and confirmed each proceeding. After every meeting, they gave a record 
of the proceedings to the Tibetan and Chinese plenipotentiaries. In the Kun gsal me 
long are found the Tibetan translations of the proceedings (see fig. 1-E). We must bear 
in mind, however, that not everything in the Kun gsal me long was translated faithfully 
from the original English proceedings; the original English proceedings were translated 
summarily or incompletely into Tibetan (see 2a1–4b3, 23b6–25a4). Furthermore, the 
authors of the Kun gsal me long often insisted on Tibetan foreign policy by partly 
referring to or quoting from the proceedings (see 63a4–72a6, 66a4–72a6). Although the 
                                                     
8 IOR/MSS/EUR/F80/189, pp. 1–26, contains the draft of this statement before submitting it to the meeting, 
which has the signature and the date by Kazi Dawa Samdup on same day.  
9 FO535/16, no. 50097, Enclosure in No. 413. Proceedings of the First Meeting of the Tibet Conference 
held at Simla on October 13, 1913. 
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original English proceedings are the primary sources from which to understand the 
process of negotiation, the Kun gsal me long contains equally valuable information 
regarding the foreign policy of the Tibetan government and the thinking of the Tibetan 
plenipotentiary at the negotiations.  
2. The Tibetan translation of the statements of the Chinese and British 
plenipotentiaries. Fig. 1-E indicates that the main English statements of the Chinese 
and British plenipotentiaries were translated in the Kun gsal me long (see 8b4–12a4, 
37b4–43a4, 45a2–47b4, and so on). The authors did not mention how the English 
statements of the Chinese and British plenipotentiaries were translated and recorded in 
the Kun gsal me long. However, according to my reading, most of these statements 
were translated relatively faithfully from the original statements, in contrast to the 
English proceedings mentioned above. In other words, by comparing the Kun gsal me 
long with the English statements, we can begin to answer the following question: How 
did Tibetan officials literally and figuratively translate western diplomatic terms and 
concepts? How did they perceive and/or understand modern concepts and terms related 
to state-building and international relations at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
such as sovereignty, suzerainty, autonomy, independence, nations, territory, and so on? 
Owing to space constraints, a thorough explanation will have to wait, but in this article 
I hope to demonstrate that the Kun gsal me long is an extremely valuable source from 
which to research questions about modern Tibetan history that have gone unanswered 
because of a lack of materials.  
 
Group 3: The Tibetan Documents that Cannot Be Found in the English Materials as 
English Translations 
In group 1, I explained that the Kun gsal me long contains the pre-translation Tibetan 
statements. In addition to this, the Kun gsal me long contains valuable Tibetan 
documents that cannot be found in the British record as English translations. The table 
shows that some Tibetan documents were not recorded in the IOR, FO, and BQ, as 
indicated by empty cells. According to the authors’ explanation, the Tibetan 
plenipotentiary withheld one long petition despite preparing it (see 56a3–56a4, 145b–
150b1). Including this petition, the authors recorded three unsubmitted petitions in 
144a–159b of the last chapter.  
Besides those, several petitions in the Kun gsal me long have thus far not been 
found in the English materials as either English translations or original Tibetan 
documents, despite the authors’ claims that they definitely submitted these to their 
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assistant Charles Bell. The contents of these petitions are of great significance to 
investigating how the Tibetan plenipotentiary thought about the political status of Tibet 
and the historical relationship between Tibet and China. For instance, “the 
counter-argument to the Chinese proposal,” the long petition to Charles Bell in 12a5–
23b6, attempts to explain in detail why Tibet considered itself a historically 
independent country. Although further investigation of the archival English sources is 
required, one of the important features of the Kun gsal me long as a historical source is 
that it contains Tibetan language petitions that are not found in the English materials.   
Please note, however, that the Kun gsal me long does not contain a very important 
group of historical Tibetan documents, which the Tibetan plenipotentiary prepared and 
submitted in order to show the historical evidence of effective control of the Tibetan 
government over the border area, including Kham between Tibet and China.10 The 
Tibetan plenipotentiary translated approximately ten of the total ninety documents into 
English with the assistance of Kazi Dawa Samdup and submitted those at the meeting. 
Therefore, these Tibetan historical materials can be found in the IOR, FO and BQ as 
English translations (see IOR/MSS/EUR/F80/170 and180; BQ: 58-90). Nevertheless, 
the authors of the Kun gsal me long did not make a full record of the original ninety 
Tibetan items, only recording the list of documents (see㻌140b5–143b).11 
 
Group 4: The Agreements that Were Concluded at the Conference 
Aside from the proceedings, statements, letters, and petitions, the Kun gsal me long also 
contains the all of the agreements that the Tibetan plenipotentiary signed, as follows: 
1. The tripartite convention between the United Kingdom, China, and Tibet, 
July 3, 1914 (the Chinese plenipotentiary refused to sign), in 72a6–77a1.  
2. The declaration between the United Kingdom and Tibet, July 3, 1914, in 
77a1–77a5.  
3. The trade regulation between Tibet and the United Kingdom, July 3, 1914, 
in 102a1–107b1. 
4. The exchange of the notes between the British and Tibetan 
plenipotentiaries, March 24, 1914 in 108a6 (phyi bod…) –109a5. 
                                                     
10 Before the tripartite convention began, at Rgyal rtse, Charles Bell advised the Tibetan plenipotentiary to 
collect historical materials in order to negotiate with China concerning the boundary problem in Kham 
(Bell: 1992: 153). 
11 Further investigation is needed as to the whereabouts of the original ninety documents after the 
conference. These documents perhaps were inherited by Shakabpa from his uncle Khri-smon (Shakabpa 
1976: 3–4). 
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By comparing agreements Nos. 1, 2, and 3 with the original texts in the file 
FO93/105 held in the National Archives of the United Kingdom, I confirmed that the 
authors recorded each agreement faithfully, although minor differences of spelling can 
be found between the two. As for the fourth agreement, it is the famous secret 
agreement of the new India–Tibet border in the Assam Himalaya area, known as “the 
McMahon Line,” which has been closely researched because of the current border 
dispute between India and China. Since both the IOR and FO only possess the English 
text, as far as I know, the Tibetan text in the Kun gsal me long is a valuable source for 
us to research how the Tibetan plenipotentiary concluded this agreement.  
In addition to the four groups of documents mentioned above, the authors, 
Bshad-sgra and Khri-smon, wrote the preface (see 2a1–4b3) and inserted the original 
comments in several places at the beginning or the end of the document (for instance, 
see 101a1–102a2). In particular, the preface clearly expresses the authors’ 
understanding of the historical relationship with China as the Priest–Patron 
Relationship (mchod-yon in Tibetan), in order to insist that Tibet is to China as a priest 
is to his disciple, and that Tibet is not subject to the power of China. Therefore, the Kun 
gsal me long is not a simple collection of documents, and the following section 
elucidates the perspective and standpoint of the authors. 
 
4. The Foreign Policy of the Tibetan Government in the Early Twentieth Century 
First, we have to consider that the authors of the Kun gsal me long are the 
plenipotentiary and his assistant at the conference, and that this text was written for the 
benefit of the Tibetan government in order to show the entire process of the negotiation 
in Simla. If the authors were able to show a lot of documents and information about the 
conference, they inevitably encountered some important problems: How did they treat 
facts such as concessions to the Chinese or Britain during the negotiation in the Kun 
gsal me long?  
At the beginning of the conference, the Tibetan plenipotentiaries claimed their 
independence and the integrating of all of the territories where the Tibetan people lived. 
At the final stage of the conference, however, they had made some concessions at the 
behest of the Britain in order to reach the agreement. After negotiating the tripartite 
convention proposed by Britain, the Tibetan plenipotentiary accepted the division of 
Tibet into Outer/Inner Tibet, and also recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet 
following the British proposal. Besides this, in the bilateral agreement between Tibet 
and Britain, the Tibetan plenipotentiary accepted the transfer of large-scale territory to 
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British India in March 1914. The Tibetan plenipotentiary must have reluctantly 
compromised on the political status of Tibet and the division of its territory. It seems 
that the authors, the Tibetan plenipotentiaries, had to explain that their concessions 
were unavoidable and explain the rightness of their diplomatic negotiation in the Kun 
gsal me long. The 66a4–66b4 indicates how the authors described the negotiation at the 
final stage of the conference as follows:  
 
The Chinese Government did not accept this convention because it brings China 
a great loss of all the power over land and people. Hence, Ivan Chen continued 
to request the instruction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Peking every day 
in idleness. Moreover, since the Chinese government strongly set forth reasons 
why he could not sign the convention to the British Government in London, too, 
the [two] governments continued to discuss mutually. Accordingly, [Ivan Chen] 
said that he could converse when [their discussion] was settled. Because those 
who are present here [as] negotiators of the three [parties] of the Great Britain, 
Tibet, and China are the plenipotentiaries of each country, a platform must be 
issued after they initialed [the convention to say] that [their initials] are identical 
to the great seal of each country. Exactly on the day we initialed [the 
convention], I also received strict orders from [my] country that [we] did not 
have any funds such as Derge and Nyarong to be given to the district of Inner 
Tibet [from Outer Tibet as autonomous region] and that [we] were not ready to 
take responsibility for the cause of destruction and the loss of the tax revenue 
[caused by the Chinese army]. However, I did not dare to make [these] claims, 
[for] it violates the [diplomatic] rule (lam lugs). It is very strange that the 
government in Peking dares to claim to the British Government in London 
although they understand this [rule].   
 
After putting his initial (sa-yig) on the draft convention, the Chinese 
plenipotentiary, Ivan Chen, refused to affix his formal signature (rtags-’dzugs) on the 
final convention. Apparently, the Chinese government in Beijing attempted to negotiate 
with the British government in London without Tibetan participation in order to 
achieve a more advantageous agreement with Britain to replace the agreements at Simla. 
Meanwhile, Ivan Chen, in Simla, also continued to wait for the instruction of the 
Chinese government in Beijing every day in idleness. The authors strongly criticized 
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Ivan Chen for not taking responsibility as the plenipotentiary, and it was tantamount to 
a neglect of diplomatic “rule.”  
In contrast to this, the authors emphasized that the Tibetan plenipotentiary 
respected the “rule.” That is why they could not make further demands of the British 
plenipotentiary after he initialed the draft of the convention, although he received orders 
from the Tibetan government in Lhasa to claim further territories of Eastern Tibet in the 
final convention. In other words, the authors attempts to justify the Tibetan 
plenipotentiary’s diplomatic negotiation in comparison with his Chinese counterpart. 
In addition to the criticism to the Chinese plenipotentiary, the authors persistently 
insisted that the Tibetan plenipotentiary also had to maintain a close relationship with 
Britain at that time to secure their territory from the Chinese army. The 68b3–69b1 of 
the Kun gsal me long indicates how the Tibetan Government dealt with the crisis in 
Eastern Tibet during the Simla Conference. During the time of the Simla Conference, 
the Tibetan government was fighting a battle with the Chinese army in Eastern Tibet. 
The Tibetan government needed to exclude the Chinese army from there by concluding 
an advantageous convention in the Simla Conference. However, they could not reach 
the tripartite convention, because the Chinese plenipotentiary would not agree to sign. 
Therefore, the authors explained that the Tibetan government needed to import British 
guns and cannons to oppose the Chinese army. In other words, building the alliance 
with Britain against China was the most important principle of the diplomatic policy of 
the Tibetan government at that time. 
 
5. Conclusion:  
The Kun gsal me long not only contains the translated main English proceedings from 
the Simla Conference, but also many documents that cannot be found in the British 
official records. This is an important record for understanding the process of 
negotiation by the Tibetan plenipotentiary at the Simla Conference. Nevertheless, in 
using the Kun gsal me long as a historical source, one must be careful about its possible 
biases. We have to bear in mind that the Kun gsal me long was described, compiled, 
and justified from the author’s point of view. As such, it may offer some justification of 
the propriety of the Tibetan plenipotentiary’s diplomatic negotiation, as well as place 
more emphasis on the importance of British support, such as importing British guns and 
cannons, to protect Eastern Tibet from the Chinese army. However, this kind of bias is 
also one of the values of the Kun gsal me long, because it is a reflection of the most 
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important principle of the diplomatic policy of the Tibetan government in the early 
twentieth century: the alliance with Britain against China. 
Thus far, some scholars have emphasized that the Simla Conference was one of 
the maneuvers of British imperialism to divide the Chinese “rightful territory,” 
including Tibet. However, the Kun gsal me long is a valuable Tibetan source that 
clearly proves that the Tibetan alliance with Britain was not just a maneuver by the 
British government. In fact, the Tibetan government itself chose this policy to support 
its struggle with China. As previously mentioned in this article, there are still many 
questions about the Kun gsal me long that will require further investigation; it is my 
hope that my present study sheds new light on this important material.  
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